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Union Presence in Disciplinary Meetings
In recent years, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has
endeavored to protect employee job security by recognizing a right un-
der the National Labor Relations Act1 to have a union steward attend
disciplinary meetings. 2 In 1967 the NLRB held that denial of a union
steward's request to accompany an employee is a breach of the em-
ployer's duty to bargain with the union imposed by section 8(a)(5); the
Fifth Circuit denied enforcement on other grounds.3 In 1972 the Board
asserted that an employer's denial of an employee request for a steward
violates section 8(a)(1), because attendance of the steward is one of the
6.concerted activities for ... mutual aid or protection" protected by
section 7 of the Act.4 The Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have re-
jected this position.5
1 Ch. 372, §§ 1 et seq., 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970)
[hereinafter cited as NLRA].
2 Two cases before 1967 had raised this issue. In Ross Gear & Tool Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1012,
1033-34, 17 L.R.R.M. 36, 39 (1945), an employee-union representative was the subject of
an investigatory meeting and, relying on the fact that grievance procedures were then pend-
ing, requested the attendance of union committeemen. The employer refused the request
and the Board held that the refusal violated section 8(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit disagreed
and stated that permitting employees to refuse attendance at such meetings would en-
courage insubordination. NLRB v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 158 F.2d 607, 613 (7th Cir.
1947). In Dobbs Houses, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1565, 1571, 55 L.R.R.M. 1218 (1964), the Board
affirmed without opinion a trial examiner's dismissal of a section 8(a)(1) complaint based
on an employer's refusal to allow union representation at a disciplinary meeting.
3 Texaco, Inc., Producing Div., 168 N.L.R.B. 361, 66 L.R.R.M. 1296 (1967), enforcement
denied on other grounds, 408 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that the meeting was in-
vestigatory). Section 8(a)(5) declares that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the
provisions of section 159(a) of this title [NLRA § 9(a)]." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970). Section
9(a) provides in part that such representatives "shall be the exclusive representatives of all
the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
(1970).
4 See cases cited note 5 infra. Section 8(a)(1) declares that it is an unfair labor practice
for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title [NLRA § 7]." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
Section 7 provides that "employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection .... 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
5 NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 485 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 42
U.S.L.W. 3544 (U.S. Mar. 26, 1974) (No. 1363), denying enforcement of 202 N.L.R.B. No.
69, 82 L.R.R.M. 1559 (1973); Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1973),
denying enforcement of 196 N.L.R.B. 1052, 80 L.R.R.M. 1188 (1972); NLRB v. Quality Mfg.
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This comment considers whether the National Labor Relations Act
provides a right to have a union steward6 present at disciplinary meet-
ings.7 It concludes that this right is granted employees under sections 7
and 8(a)(1) and unions under sections 9(a) and 8(a)(5). The comment
demonstrates that exercise of these rights would not seriously disrupt
employer operations and suggests a rule for defining when a meeting
is disciplinary. Finally, the comment discusses whether the union and
the individual should be permitted to waive these rights.8
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE
In seeking to establish the right to union presence at disciplinary
meetings, the Board has not articulated adequately the statutory foun-
dation for the right or assessed the impact of the right on employer
operations. The Board has also failed to provide more than a very gen-
eral definition of what constitutes a disciplinary meeting. These fail-
ures may explain the refusal of the courts of appeals to enforce the
Board's orders.
A. Breach of the Duty to Bargain under Section 9(a) as
Protected by Section 8(a)(5)
In Texaco, Inc., Houston Producing Division,9 an employee was sus-
pended for an alleged theft. The employer denied requests by both the
Co., 481 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3340 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1973)
(No. 765), denying enforcement in part of 195 N.L.R.B. 197, 79 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1972).
6 This comment will use the term "steward" to describe the union's representative for
a unit; the use of this term does not imply that a particular, titled union official is appro-
priate for this statutory right.
7 The Board cannot force employers to hold disciplinary meetings; its remedies in these
cases have been limited to cease and desist orders against the meetings and reinstatement
for those employees discharged for refusal to attend such conferences alone. Mobil Oil
Corp. 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 n.3, 80 L.R.R.M. 1188, 1193 n.3 (1972). This comment suggests
that remedies should be limited to reversal of improperly imposed discipline. See text
and notes at notes 91-95 infra.
In theory, the employer could resort to summary discipline. In practice the meetings
serve to prevent erroneous discipline and are likely to continue even if steward attendance
is required. Loss of trained personnel not actually guilty of any wrongdoing is costly to
the employer and likely to be reversed in the grievance procedure, and plant morale suf-
fers if employees are unjustly disciplined.
8 The potential importance of this right to the individual employee is great. One com-
mentator estimates that more than 75 percent of all reported cases concerning employee
enforcement of contracts arise from discharge situations. Summers, Individual Rights in
Collective Agreements-A Preliminary Analysis, N.Y.U. 12TH CONFERENCE ON LABOR 63,
83 (1959). See 0. PHELPS, DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE IN THE UNIONIZED Fums 8, 16-17 (1959).
For the employee, discipline is a critical issue; his termination may not only end ac-
cumulated seniority but also affect possibilities of reemployment. L. STESSlN, EMPLOYEE
DISCIPLINE vii (1960).
9 168 N.L.R.B. 361, 66 L.R.R.M. 1296 (1967), enforcement denied, 408 F.2d 142 (5th Cir.
1969).
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employee and a steward that the steward be present at a post-suspension
meeting called to investigate the employee's conduct. At the meeting,
the employee signed a confession, and his suspension was affirmed by
the employer. The Board ruled that the employer had violated section
8(a)(5) by dealing directly with the employee over the terms of his em-
ployment rather than with the union as the bargaining agent selected
by the employees under section 9(a).10 The Board held that union at-
tendance was required because the purpose of the meeting was not in-
vestigatory-discipline had been considered from the outset.1 '
Under this approach, the union's right to be represented by its stew-
ard depends on the nature of the meeting.12 A disciplinary meeting is
viewed as concerned with a possible change in employee status; the em-
ployer is therefore bargaining with the employee regarding his terms of
employment. At an investigatory meeting, where the employer is
merely gathering facts or learning about an incident in the plant, the
employee's future status is not an issue. The Fifth Circuit accepted the
Board's test's but held that there was no evidence supporting the
Board's determination that the meeting was disciplinary. If an inter-
view "dealt only with eliciting facts and not with the consequences of
the facts revealed, its subject matter was not within the scope of com-
pulsory collective bargaining."'14
10 Id. at 362, 66 L.R.R.M. at 1297. The Board relied on the union's status as collective
bargaining agent and not on the proviso to section 9(a) that gives the union the right to
attend the adjustment of employee grievances. Id. at 362 n.3, 66 L.R.R.M. at 1297. A few
arbitrators have used the section 9(a) proviso to justify union presence at disciplinary
meetings, arguing that an employee summoned to a meeting regarding his job becomes
"aggrieved" once his behavior is challenged by the employer and that a "difference" or
"complaint" has therefore arisen under the contract's grievance clause. Waste King Uni-
versal Prods. Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 283, 286-87 (1966); Caterpillar Tractor Co., 44 Lab. Arb.
647, 650 (1965); Food Employers Council, Inc., 40 Lab. Arb. 1100, 1101 (1963); Braniff Air-
ways, Inc., 27 Lab. Arb. 892 (1957). This analysis is questionable, because at the time of
summons it is difficult to show an existing grievance. Electric Motors & Specialties, Inc., 149
N.L.R.B. 1432, 1440, 57 L.R.R.M. 1513 (1964) (trial examiner's decision); Chevron Chem.
Co., 60 Lab. Arb. 1066, 1070 (1973); Masonite Corp., 54 Lab. Arb. 633, 638 (1970).
11 168 N.L.R.B. at 362, 66 L.R.R.M. at 1297.
12 See Lafayette Radio Electronics Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. 491, 78 L.R.R.M. 1693 (1971);
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 834, 78 L.R.R.M. 1109 (1971); Wald Mfg. Co., 176
N.L.R.B. 839, 73 L.R.R.M. 1486 (1969), enforcement granted on other grounds, 426 F.2d
1328 (6th Cir. 1970); Dayton Typographic Serv., Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 357, 72 L.R.R.M. 1073
(1969); Texaco, Inc., Sales Terminal, 179 N.L.R.B. 976, 72 L.R.R.M. 1596 (1969); Jacobe-
Pearson Ford, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 594, 68 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1968); Chevron Oil Co., 168
N.L.R.B. 574, 66 L.R.R.M. 1353 (1967); Texaco, Inc., Producing Div., 168 N.L.R.B. 361,
66 L.R.R.M. 1296 (1967), enforcement denied, 408 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1969).
13 Texaco, Inc., Producing Div. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 142, 145 (5th Cir. 1969).
14 Id. This statement disregards the company's apparent motive in imposing provisional
discipline and subsequently holding a conference to decide whether the discipline should
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The Board's subsequent efforts to define the distinction between
investigatory and disciplinary meetings did not produce a clear stand-
ard. In Texaco, Inc., Los Angeles Sales Terminal,15 for example, an
employee had been suspended for refusing to operate allegedly defec-
tive equipment. The employer's denial of his request for union repre-
sentation at a subsequent meeting was approved by the trial examiner,
who held that the meeting was designed to allow the employee to pre-
sent his side of the dispute and was therefore investigatory.
Affirming without opinion the trial examiner's dismissal of the com-
plaint, the Board seemed to accept his conclusion that since the em-
ployer was not "precommitted" to discipline, the meeting was not dis-
ciplinary.16 This standard clearly requires a case-by-case review of the
behavior and intent of the employer,1'7 with conjectural inferences from
ambiguous actions. Under this test, neither the employer nor the em-
ployee can be confident that his judgment of the situation will be con-
firmed by the Board and the court.18
The Board's attempt to restrict the right to disciplinary meetings re-
flects concern that a broad application of the right to union presence
in employer-employee meetings would unduly disrupt employer opera-
tions. Intervention in even the most routine conferences between the
employer and individual workers would disrupt established personnel
practices. 19 Employers would be unable to keep informed on plant
operations if unions were always present to shield their members from
criticism.20 An excessively broad right might also interfere with the
parties' section 9(a) rights to contract regarding disciplinary proce-
dures.21
be affirmed or modified. The "consequences" of employee misconduct surely were at issue
in the meeting, since its result was an affirmation of the suspension.
'5 179 N.L.R.B. 976, 72 L.R.R.M. 1596 (1969).
16 Id. at 986 (trial examiner's decision).
17 The trial examiner also noted that the employee did not have reasonable cause to
believe that the meeting was disciplinary. Id. at 987. The employee's reasonable belief
did not become important, however, until later cases. See text and note at notes 27-29 9-
95 infra.
18 The trial examiner in Texaco, Inc., Sales Terminal tried to summarize the Board's
test. An employee could claim the right to union representation "when management's
course of conduct with respect to some job or plant situation provides objective manifes-
tations sufficient reasonably to justify the conclusion that a disciplinary reaction, regard-
ing the concerned worker or workers, will be forthcoming." Id. at 983 (emphasis in original).
19 Wald Mfg. Co., 176 N.L.R.B. 839, 846, 73 L.R.R.M. 1486 (1969) (trial examiner's
decision), enforcement granted on other grounds, 426 F.2d 1328 (6th Cir. 1970); Chevron
Oil Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 574,578, 66 L.R.R.M. 1353 (1968) (trial examiner's decision).
20 Texaco, Inc., Producing Div. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 142, 145 (5th Cir. 1969).
21 Texaco, Inc., Sales Terminal, 179 N.L.R.B. 976, 984, 72 L.R.R.M. 1596 (1969) (trial
examiner's decision), citing Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 217
(1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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B. The Employee's Right under Section 7 as Protected
by Section 8(a)(1)
In 1972 the Board began to rely on sections 7 and 8(a)(1) to establish
employees' right to union representation at disciplinary meetings.2 2 As
in the section 8(a)(5) cases, the Board did little to explain the statutory
foundation; specifically, it did not explain why such union assistance
qualified as a "concerted activity" under section 7.23 Although many em-
ployee activities that fit the literal terms of the section are unprotected
because of the historical meaning and purpose of the section,24 the
Board relied on a literal reading, asserting that since requesting steward
attendance is enlisting the support of another member of the bargain-
ing unit, it is a concerted activity.25 The Board distinguished cases in
which it had relied on section 9(a) as involving the right of the union,
rather than the right of the individual employee, to seek union as-
sistance.26
Under the Board's section 7 approach, employers cannot discipline
employees who insist on union representation even where the union's
right to bargain is not involved. If an employee has reasonable grounds
to believe that discipline will be an issue in a meeting, an employer
cannot penalize him for refusing to attend without a steward.
27 The
22 See cases cited note 5 supra. With the exception of Texaco, Inc., Sales Terminal, 179
N.L.R.B. 976, 72 L.R.R.M. 1596 (1969), Texaco, Inc., Producing Div., 168 N.L.R.B. 361,
66 L.R.R.M. 1296 (1967), enforcement denied, 408 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1969), and Jacobe-
Pearson Ford, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 594, 68 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1968), there was no discussion be-
fore 1972 of the possible existence of a section 7 right to union representation.
23 See note 4 supra.
24 For example, section 7 does not protect illegal activities. See Mobil Oil Corp. v.
NLRB, 482 F.2d 842, 846 (7th Cir. 1973), citing Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31
(1942) (mutiny), and NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939) (violent
sitdown strike). Nor does the section protect acts of disloyalty to the employer, even
though employees may have acted in concert, NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464
(1953). But see NLRB v. Washington Alum. Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962). The section is not
limited, however, to activities that constitute "economic pressure." See text and note at
note 35 infra.
25 As the Board explained in Mobil Oil:
Thus it is a serious violation of the employee's individual right to engage in concerted
activity by seeking the assistance of his statutory representative if the employer denies
the employee's request and compels the employee to appear unassisted at an interview
which may put his job security in jeopardy. Such a dilution of the employee's right
to act collectively to protect his job interests is, in our view, unwarranted interference
with his right to insist on concerted protection, rather than individual self-protection,
against possible adverse employer action.
196 N.L.R.B. at 1052, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1191.
26 See text and note at note 10 supra. See also 37 NLRB ANN. RE'. 91-92 (1972).
27 Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052, 80 L.R.R.M. 1188, enforcement denied, 482 F.2d
842 (9th Cir. 1973); Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197, 198, 79 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1972),
enforcement denied in part, 481 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W.
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Board said that the reasonableness of the employee's refusal would
be judged objectively, 2s but Member Kennedy noted in dissent that
each review of employer action would require a determination based
on the subjective fears of the employee.29
The Board thus failed to articulate the statutory basis for its reli-
ance on section 7, to define adequately when a meeting is disciplinary,
or to examine how the right would affect employer operations. These
failures may explain the rejection of this right by the three courts of
appeals that have considered the question.30 The Fourth Circuit, for
example, emphasized the Board's failure to explain its reliance on the
provisions of section 7.31 Without a statutory rationale for the right, the
court was swayed by what it termed the "prerogative" of the employer
to conduct investigatory interviews without interference. It also noted
that the Board.had not reconciled its position with Congress's intent
to promote a free enterprise economy and preserve the employer's con-
trol over his operations.3 2 The Fifth Circuit also followed this reason-
ing in refusing to find a right to representation. 3
3340 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1973) (No. 765). The employer remained free, of course, to impose dis-
cipline without holding a meeting.
28 Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197, 198 n.3, 79 L.R.R.M. 1269, 1271 n.3 (1972).
29 Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052, 1054, 80 L.R.R.M. 1188, 1192 (1972), enforcement
denied, 482 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1973). Member Kennedy's repeated dissents from the doc-
trine are also based on a fundamental disagreement with the Board position. See id. at
1053, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1191; Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197, 200, 79 L.R.R.M. 1269,
1272 (1972). See also New York Tel. Co., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 180, 83 L.R.R.M. 1353, 1355
(1973); Service Tech. Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 845 n.1, 80 L.R.R.M. 1187 (1972) (concurring).
Union representation at disciplinary meetings, he asserts, is to be sought at the bargain-
ing table, not within section 7. Mobil Oil Corp., supra at 1056, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1194 (1972).
Requiring employers to accept union presence amounts to imposition of a contract term,
an act beyond the scope of the Board's authority. Id. He further notes that the Board has
neither described the steward's function at such meetings nor explained how he might
safeguard the employee's interests. Id. at 1053, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1192.
30 See cases cited at note 5 supra. Both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits held that the
meetings at issue were investigatory and refused to accept the Board's conclusion that a
section 7 right to union representation exists where the employee has reasonable grounds
to fear the meeting-will be disciplinary. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 485 F.2d 1135, 1138
(5th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Quality Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1018, 1024 (4th Cir. 1973), petition
for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3340 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1973) (No. 765). Where an employer is bar-
gaining with an employee at a disciplinary meeting, the Fifth Circuit would probably
find a section 8(a)(5) violation. See note 33 infra.
31 NLRB v. Quality Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1018, 1025 (4th Cir. 1973), petition for cert.
filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3340 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1973) (No. 765).
32 Id.
38 NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 485 F.2d 1135, 1138 (5th Cir. 1973), petition for cert.
filed, 42 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Mar. 26, 1974) (No. 1363). The court said that its result might be
different if there were an open disciplinary purpose to the meeting, "so that grievance
hearings later on would merely put the seal on the employer's prejudgment." Id. This is
precisely the danger of not allowing union presence whenever discipline is an issue. See
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The Seventh Circuit criticized the Board for failing to evaluate the
employee's interest in freedom from arbitrary discharge or to weigh it
against the employer's interest in maintaining his authority. The court
found that permitting union representation would create crippling de-
lays for a "cost-conscious, competitive business," 34 and stated that sec-
tion 7 was meant to protect only activities that constitute "economic
pressure" for effective union organization and therefore does not create
a right to representation at disciplinary meetings. 35
Confronted with an ill-defined right of potentially great breadth,
these courts were not unreasonable in fearing excessive conferencing
and government intervention, especially given the obvious analogy to
criminal procedure already under consideration by some commenta-
tors.38 The alternatives were viewed as less complex and less open to
abuse-the right to union presence in disciplinary meetings could be
sought at the bargaining table,37 and an employee could always use the
grievance machinery to protect his job.38
Silard, Rights of the Accused Employee in Company Disciplinary Investigations, N.Y.U.
23RD CONFERENCE ON LABOR 217, 230 (1970).
84 Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 842, 846-47 (7th Cir. 1973).
35 Id. at 847. This is a very narrow view of the scope of section 7. Employee protest
that does not constitute "economic pressure," such as the presentation of grievances or
complaints, has been held protected by section 7. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp. v.
NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357 (4th Cir. 1969) (employee petitions); NLR.B v. Bowman Transp.
Inc., 314 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1963) (presentation of grievances); NLRB v. Moss Planing Mill
Co., 206 F.2d 557 (4th Cir. 1953) (filing of wage claims); NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 167 F.2d 983 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 845 (1948) (protest over supervisors).
See also text and notes at notes 46 & 65 infra. See generally Getman, The Protection of
Economic Pressure of Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. REv.
1195, 1231 n.150 (1967).
36 Some commentators and a few arbitrators have suggested that the safeguards of
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964),
should be extended by analogy to employees interrogated by their employer. Silard, supra
note 33, at 223-24. See Thrifty Drug Stores Co., Inc., 50 Lab. Arb. 1253, 1260-63 (1968).
But see Weirton Steel Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 103 (1968). Although neither the Board nor the
courts have dealt with such arguments, several trial examiners have dismissed them.
Lafayette Radio Electronics Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. 491, 494, 78 L.R.R.M. 1693, 1695-96 (1971);
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 834, 836, 78 L.R.R.M. 1109, 1110 (1971). Critics of this
analogy have feared that the Board would use it to frustrate employer investigation of
theft. Spelfogel, Surveillance and Interrogation in Plant Theft and Discipline Cases, N.Y.U.
21sr CONFERENCE ON LABOR 171, 172, 192 (1968). See generally Kadish, The Criminal Law
and Industrial Discipline as Sanctioning Systems: Some Comparative Observations, in
LABOR ARBXTRATION, PERSPECTIVES AND PROBLEMS, PROCEEDINGs OF THE 17TH ANNUAL MEET-
ING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBRAToPs (1964).
The Supreme Court's protection of public employees threatened with discharge for
resisting interrogation, see Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), is not authority for
application of criminal procedural rights to all disciplinary disputes, because there is no
state action in discipline of an employee by a private employer. See Comment, Private
Police Forces: Legal Powers and Limitations, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 555 (1971).
87 Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 842, 846 (7th Cir. 1973).
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This review of the precedents demonstrates that the issue of union
presence at disciplinary meetings has not received satisfactory exam-
ination, largely due to the Board's uncertain statements of the reasons
for its stance. Both the Board and the courts require a more complete
and coherent basis for resolution of the issue. The facial meaning of
sections 7 and 9(a) and the policies they were designed to serve must be
examined to determine whether employees and unions can insist on the
presence of a steward at disciplinary meetings.
II. SECTION 7 AND CONCERTED AcTIviTxEs
Section 7 was intended to protect employees' rights to organize and
to protest employer action. 39 Although not all labor activities are pro-
tected by the section,40 it has been the duty of the Board, subject to
judicial review, to determine when employers may restrict otherwise
protected activity.41
The protections of section 7 are limited to concerted activity carried
on for the mutual aid or protection of employees; 42 mere "griping" or
individual protest, if not accompanied by evidence that the grievance
is supported by others, is not protected.43 Recent decisions on section
7, particularly those that adopt the docrtine of "constructive concerted
activities, '"44 indicate that inclusion of the right to union presence at
disciplinary meetings is not a radical departure from the case law on
the section.
A. Rights of the Employee Called to the Meeting
1. "Constructive Concerted Activities." The Board and some courts
have approved employee activities that are not immediately recogniz-
able as concerted activities engaged in for the mutual aid or protection
of other employees.45 The leading case is NLRB v. Interboro Con-
38 Cf. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 485 F.2d 1135, 1138 (5th Cir. 1973), petition for
cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3544 (U.S. Mar. 26, 1974) (No. 1363).
39 NLRB v. Schwartz, 146 F.2d 773, 774 (5th Cir. 1945).
40 See note 24 supra.
41 See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 315-16 (1965).
42 See note 4 supra.
43 Indiana Gear Works v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1967); Joanna Cotton Mills
Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749, 753 (4th Cir. 1949). This limitation may reflect a belief that
individual complaints are not worthy of protection, would overburden the Board, or
would undermine the authority of the bargaining agent. See Note, The Requirement of
"Concerted" Action under the NLRA, 53 COLUM. L. Rav. 514,517 (1953).
44 See cases cited at note 45 infra; Comment, Constructive Concerted Activity and In-
dividual Rights: The Northern Metal-nterboro Split, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 152 (1972) [here-
inafter cited as Constructive Concerted Activity].
45 See Ben Pekin Corp., 452 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Selwyn Shoe Mfg. Corp.,
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tractors, Inc.,46 where the Second Circuit held that discharge of an em-
ployee for complaining that the employer was not paying overtime or
providing necessary safety gear as required by the contract violated
section 7. The court found that concerted activity exists when a single
employee attempts to enforce his understanding of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. The rationale for this interpretation is that the
individual employee is relying on an agreement made by and for the
benefit of the entire bargaining unit. He is not merely expressing a per-
sonal gripe; his voice is that of all those in the unit covered by the
contract, some of whom may also have the same complaint.47
This reasoning is the basis of the Second Circuit's later decision that
to be protected the employee's activity must be based on at least a
reasonable construction of the contract term; 48 an unreasonable inter-
pretation would be merely an individual gripe.49 The employee's ac-
tivity is concerted because he acts, by implication, for other employees
in pressing for the rights created by the contract.
Reliance on the contract also establishes that the activity is carried
on for mutual aid or protection. By seeking to ensure adherence to the
contract, the employee is both advocate and example. The attempted
implementation of the contract will benefit the entire unit. 0 The at-
tempt to enforce contractual rights also increases the collective strength
of the union which negotiated the contract. Therefore, even if an em-
ployee is the only one affected by an employer policy, he is still acting
"in concert" when he attempts reform. 51 Contract rights lose their
vitality if an employee is reluctant to proceed alone; his protest may
encourage others to do the same in the future. 52
428 F.2d 217 (8th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Interboro Contractors Inc., 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir.
1967); J.A. Ferguson Constr. Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 1494, 68 L.R.R.M. 1578 (1968); Bunney
Bros. Constr. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 1516, 51 L.R.R.M. 1532 (1962). Contra, NLRB v. Buddies
Supermkts., 481 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881
(3rd Cir. 1971). The Ninth Circuit, while not rejecting the principle, has required that the
individual be acting for the benefit of fellow employees when he invokes rights under
the contract. See NLRB v. C & I Air Conditioning, Inc., 486 F.2d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 1973)
(dictum); NLRB v. H.C. Smith Constr. Co., 439 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1971), enforcing 174
N.L.R.B. 1178, 70 L.R.R.M. 1462 (1969).
48 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
47 Id. at 500.
48 NLRB v. J. Langenbacher Co., Inc., 398 F.2d 459, 463 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1049 (1969); cf. NLRB v. H.C. Smith Constr. Co., 439 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1971).
49 See Comment, Constructive Concerted Activity, supra note 44, at 159.
50 Id. at 166; cf. Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 338, 343 (9th Cir. 1968); B & M
Excavating, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 1152, 1155, 60 L.R.R.M. 1466 (1965), enforced, 368 F.2d 624
(9th Cir. 1966).
51 See NLRB v. Century Broadcasting Corp., 419 F.2d 771, 780 (8th Cir. 1969).
52 B & M Excavating, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 1152, 60 L.R.R.M. 1466 (1965), enforced, 368
F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1966).
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Union representation at disciplinary meetings would fulfill a sim-
ilar function. The employee's ability to insist on union attendance
identifies the interest of the bargaining unit with his plight and alerts
the unit to its shared interest in any discipline imposed. Granting such
assistance to an employee confronted with employer discipline protects
the interest of the entire unit in freedom from arbitrary discipline and
encourages others to insist on similar protection.
The constructive concerted activities cases treat disputes in which
a contract term is at issue. Although many disciplinary cases hinge on
the interpretation of a contract term, some are purely factual disputes.
Even if an employee contests only the factual allegations, however,
resolution of the case may affect other employees. The quantum of
proof that the employer considers sufficient to support disciplinary
action is of concern to the entire bargaining unit. A slow accretion of
custom and practice may come to control the handling of disciplinary
disputes. If, for example, the employer adopts a practice of considering
foreman's unsubstantiated statements sufficient to support disciplinary
action, employee protection against unwarranted punishment is af-
fected.53 The presence of a union steward allows protection of this
interest by the bargaining representative.
2. Incipient Concerted Activities. Courts have recognized that or-
ganized protest would be stifled if employers could penalize employees
for soliciting or encouraging organized protest. The Seventh Circuit has
thus ruled that concerted activity is present if the employee has at-
tempted to obtain valid group support.54 The Third Circuit's narrower
view of concert-agreement in fact 55 -has been criticized as an unreal-
istic view of the dynamics of employee protest.56 Section 7 must protect
incipient as well as ripened concerted activity, so as to prevent employ-
ers from halting protest before it gains sufficient momentum to be
effective. 57
Even if union presence at the disciplinary meeting is not full con-
certed activity, it is an incipient form of activity under the Seventh
Circuit's approach. Post-discipline grievance procedures unquestion-
ably constitute concerted activity. The presence of the steward in-
creases the likelihood that the union will pursue the employee's com-
53 See note 80 infra.
5- Indiana Gear Works v. NLR.B, 371 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1967). Some types of
support are, of course, not permitted. See note 63 infra.
55 NLR.B v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884 (3rd Cir. 1971).
56 See Comment, Constructive Concerted Activity, supra note 44, at 166, 172.
57 The Third Circuit has recognized the problem of inhibiting employee protest be-
fore it has resulted in action. See Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1347
(3rd Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 935 (1970).
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plaint through the grievance procedure, 58 and the employee will be
more effective within the grievance procedure if the steward has wit-
nessed the disciplinary meeting. 9 An employer's refusal to permit union
attendance at disciplinary meetings thus frustrates the incipient con-
certed activity of grievance resolution.
B. Rights of Other Members of the Unit
Some courts have either rejected or not yet dealt with the construc-
tive concerted activities doctrine.60 Other interpretations of section 7,
however, suggest that attendance of a union steward at a disciplinary
meeting is concerted activity, and that the other employees in the unit
have the right to demand, through the union, the presence of a steward.
Employee protests designed to show support for a grievant and
simultaneously to focus attention on the dispute have been held pro-
tected even though only a single employee is threatened by employer
action."1 These cases have found mutual aid or protection in the assur-
ance such protests afford all employees that they can rely on their fellow
workers should they become targets of discipline.62 For example, four
58 A union does not have an absolute duty to process employee grievances through the
grievance procedure, and the meeting is the steward's first opportunity to judge the worth
of the employee's claim. See note 100 infra.
59 A steward not familiar with the facts revealed at the disciplinary meeting might be
handicapped in his subsequent representation of the employee. By protecting the right of
the steward to be present at this point, courts would be strengthening the ability of
employees to prosecute grievances. See note 88 infra.
60 See cases cited at note 45 supra. In NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, 481 F.2d 714,
719 (5th Cir. 1973), an employee was discharged for protesting the commission rate con-
mined in his own individual contract. It is unclear whether the case really concerned
"constructive" concerted activity; the court concluded that the employee was "griping"
about his individual contract. In NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881 (3rd Cir.
1971), the court called the doctrine of "constructive" concerted activity a legal "fiction,"
and thus refused to reinstate a probationary employee who had been dismissed for com-
plaining about the employer's failure to give him holiday pay under the contract.
61 See cases cited at notes 63-65 infra. One circuit has protected even a nonunion em-
ployee who voiced support for a strike in his plant. Although there was no suggestion of
group action or harmony of interest, there was the possibility of reciprocal aid in the
future. Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 338, 343 (9th Cir. 1968). Statements by
"noninterested" personnel ally such persons with the activities of the threatened party.
KPRS Broadcasting Corp., 181 N.L.R.B. 535, 73 L.R.R.M. 1404 (1970). See NLRB v. City
Yellow Cab Co., 344 F.2d 575, 582 (6th Cir. 1965). Union members have even been pro-
tected in protesting their firm's discriminatory hiring policies, although there would
seem to be no immediate "mutual aid or protection" present under a literal reading of
section 7. Western Addition Community Organization v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917, 926 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3457 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1974) (No. 830); NLRB v. Tanner
Motor Livery, Ltd., 349 F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1965). Such activity may, however, be restricted
if the interest in channeling reform through the bargaining agent is more compelling.
id. at5.
432 The best statement of this concept is in Judge Learned Hand's opinion in NLRB v.
Peter C.K. Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503, 505-06 (2d Cir. 1942):
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Circuits-including the Third and Fifth-have held that walkouts and
work stoppages in support of a discharged employee are for "mutual
aid or protection."63 Other cases have held that work stoppages pro-
testing severe criticism of an employee by supervisory personnel" and
protests over unsafe working conditions that affect only a single em-
ployee65 similarily are concerted activity.
When a union steward attends a disciplinary meeting as the author-
ized representative of the other employees, he fulfills the same role that
the employees themselves fulfill in a walkout or other protest. His
presence is a declaration of the employees' solidarity with the person
facing disciplinary action and expresses their concern that punishment
not be inflicted unjustly. This demonstration of solidarity and concern
is particularly important in the disciplinary context, because the effect
of disciplinary action is immediate, personal, and often severe. Although
the union presence is unlike walkouts or work stoppages in that it comes
at a time when no employer action has yet been taken, it is correspond-
ingly less disruptive than the latter forms of concerted activity. Steward
presence may in fact prevent creation of the type of situation in which
walkouts and work stoppages occur. Expression of solidarity and con-
cern through union presence in disciplinary meetings should be as
protected as similar expression through protests against disciplinary
actions.
III. UNION REPRESENTATION AND SECTION 9(a)
Although the Board's recent decisions on disciplinary meetings
have focused on employee rights under section 7, there is also a
sound statutory basis under section 9(a) for the right of the union to be
represented at such meetings. Union presence may be viewed as part of
When all the other workmen in a shop make common cause with a fellow workman
over his separate grievance, and go out on strike in his support, they engage in a
"concerted activity" for "mutual aid or protection," although the aggrieved work-
man is the only one of them who has any immediate stake in the outcome. The rest
know that by their action each one of them assures himself, in case his turn ever comes,
of the support of the one whom they are all then helping; and the solidarity so
established is "mutual aid" in the most literal sense, as nobody doubts.
63 NLRB v. Holcombe, 325 F.2d 508, 511 (5th Cir. 1963); Summit Mining Corp. v. NLRB,
260 F.2d 894, 897 (3rd Cir. 1958); Carter Carburetor Corp. v. NLRB, 140 F.2d 714, 718 (8th
Cir. 1944); see LTV Electrosystems, Inc. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 1122, 1126-27 (4th Cir. 1969)
(dictum). The protesting employees might also be viewed as cogrievants. See Comment,
Constructive Concerted Activity, supra note 44, at 167; cf. Trailmobile Div., Pullman, Inc.
v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1969). Such activities !nay be unprotected, however, if
contrary to a valid no-strike clause. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 280
(1956) (dictum); NLRB v. R.C. Can Co., 328 F.2d 974, 979 (5th Cir. 1964) (dictum).
64 -NLR.B v. Phaostron Instrument & Electronic Co., 344 F.2d 855. 858 (9th Cir. 1965).
65 Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 411, 413 (9th Cir. 1966).
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the general duty of the union, as bargaining agent, to enforce the pro-
visions of the collective bargaining agreement and resolve "any ques-
tion arising thereunder."66 The union's right to bargain with the em-
ployer on wages, hours, and working conditions does not cease with the
signing of the agreement. Bargaining is a continuing relationship that
requires each party to meet to resolve issues arising during the tenure
of the contract. 7 Union presence at disciplinary meetings is a part of
this continuing duty, because what occurs at the meeting is bargaining
over the job rights of the individual employee involved.68
The right of the union to be present at disciplinary meetings is re-
inforced by its right under section 9(a) to information it needs to per-
form the bargaining function. 9 The union has the right to this infor-
mation both to prepare demands for negotiations on new agreements
and to facilitate enforcement of the current contract7 Union presence
at disciplinary meetings enables the union to promote employee in-
terests in future contract negotiations by alerting it to problems in dis-
ciplinary rules and procedures. Union access to the meetings is also
valuable in the union's later prosecution of employee grievances, a part
of the bargaining agent's duty that continues for the duration of the
collective bargaining agreement.71 Courts have recognized that a union
would have "to grope blindly through the very stages of the grievance
procedure unless adequate information were preliminarily available,172
and have not required the union to resort to the grievance machinery
to obtain such information.7 3 Union presence at disciplinary meetings
would provide the union with that type of information.
66 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970) [NLRA § 8(d)] (definition of collective bargaining).
67 NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436 (1967); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
46 (1957).
08 See text and note at note 14 supra.
69 See Bartosic & Hartley, The Employer's Duty to Supply Information to the Union-
A Study of the Interplay of Administrative and Judicial Rationalization, 58 CoRN=l L.
REV. 23, 40 (1973). It is generally agreed that the employer has a duty to furnish the
union data on wages or plant operations in order to enable it to bargain effectively.
Fafnir Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1966); Curtis-Wright Corp. v. NLRB,
347 F.2d 61 (3rd Cir. 1965). That the union might get such information directly from
the employees involved has not been considered an excuse for the employer's refusal to
furnish such information. Hekman Furniture Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 631, 31 L.R.R.M. 1116
(1952), enforced, 207 F.2d 561 (6th Cir. 1953).
70 NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 438 (1967); Sinclair Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 306
F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1962).
71 See Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers of America, 171 F. Supp. 782, 790 (D. Md. 1959),
aff'd, 273 F.2d 614 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 849 (1960).
72 Curtis-Wright Corp. v. NLRIB, 347 F.2d 61, 71 (3rd Cir. 1965).
73 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 306 F.2d 569, 574 (5th Cir. 1962).
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IV. BALANCING THE EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE INTERESTS
Union presence at disciplinary meetings has been shown to be con-
sistent with the language of the NLRA as construed in similar situa-
tions. Mere consistency with prior constructions, however, is not suffi-
cient. The NLRA is cast in broad, generic language. Construction of
the statute must be premised on the purposes and policies the legisla-
tion was intended to serve.
Critics of union presence at disciplinary meetings suggest that it
will cause greater interference with plant operations and employer de-
cision making than the NLRA was intended to allow.74 A properly de-
fined right to union presence, however, need not make any greater in-
roads on the employer's domain than have been tolerated in other sit-
uations involving important union and employee interests.75
A. The'Role of the Steward
The activities of the steward, although of different significance for
the employee and the union, serve the purposes of both sections 7 and
9(a).
1. Under Section 7. An employee faced with possible discipline
must be able to present his case effectively. A major tenet of industrial
discipline is that identical infractions should result in equal punish-
ment.7 6 A steward, more familiar than the average employee with the
contract, plant rules, and employer customs, can be of materal assistance
in assuring that the employee is not subjected to unusual discipline.
The steward can help prevent intimidation of the employee by the
employer 77 and can assist employees who are confused by their pre-
dicament or uneducated and unable to deal with the employer on equal
terms.78 The steward can also safeguard the interests of the other em-
ployees, both by informing them of employer decisions and by gen-
erally assuring fairness in the discipline process. 79
2. Under Section 9(a). Steward presence at the disciplinary meeting
74 See text and note at note 33 supra; H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
75 See note 82 infra.
76 S. SLicfTm, J. HEALEY & E. LIVERNASH, THE IMPACr OF CoLLEarIVE BARGAINING ON
MANAGEMENT 625, 631 (1960) [hereinafter cited as S. SLCHrT et a.].
77 Intimidation by employers or their agents in the course of disciplinary meetings is
a real possibility. See Sterling Optical Co., 72-2 CCH LAB. APB. AwARDs 8422 (1972)
(employee entrapped into signing confession of theft); Thrifty Drug Stores Co., Inc., 50 Lab.
Arb. 1253 (1968) (employee signed $7,000 promissory note after admitting theft of goods
worth one-tenth that sum); Novo Indus. Corp., 41 Lab. Arb. 921 (1963) (employee who was
"rehired" after quitting signed a document forfeiting 12 years of seniority).
78 See Silard, supra note 33, at 230 n27.
79 See text and note at note 80 infra.
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gives the union information that enables it to detect trouble spots to
be treated in future contract negotiations. The union also gains de-
tailed knowledge of a potential grievance and is therefore better able
to identify and prosecute substantial grievance claims. The steward can
also serve as an advocate in bargaining-for example, where the em-
ployer offers soft treatment to the employee if he admits to an infrac-
tion. As advocate, the steward ensures that the employee is fairly
treated and that the result will be a proper precedent for future em-
ployer decisions on discipline.80 His role is closely analogous to that
accorded the union by the second proviso to section 9(a), which permits
the presence of the union at the adjustment of grievances.8'
B. Interference with Employer Interests
Employers have argued that union presence at disciplinary meetings
would mean disruption of their operations and a challenge to their
authority. Although this is possible, courts have found section 7 and
9(a) rights where the employee or union interests outweigh the inter-
ference with employer operations.8 2 In this situation, the interests of
80 As one commentator noted in the context of the grievance procedure:
Grievances may relate to the establishment of new rates and the adjustment of old;
to rulings on seniority, layoffs, and rehires; to discharges and other disciplinary
measures; to merit-increases, transfers, promotions; to the operation of an incentive
system and countless other measures. Whether they are cast in the form of an inter-
pretation of an agreement or not, any adjustments made of these questions affect the
whole plant. The rulings tend to become precedents and may eventually constitute
a body of industrial common law supplementing the formal agreement.
Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HAv. L. REv. 274,
302 (1948).
81 This proviso prohibits direct bargaining between employer and employee in order
to prevent the possible undermining of the union's position and possible jeopardy to the
rights of other employees. Duvin, The Duty to Bargain: Law in Search of Policy, 64
CoLum. L. Rxv. 248, 273 (1964).
82 The freedom of employees to seek reform is generally protected unless the employer
can justify curtailing such activity. See Robertshaw Controls Co. v. NLRB, 386 F.2d 377,
382 (4th Cir. 1967); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. NLRB, 230 F.2d 357, 358 (7th Cir. 1956).
The courts have commonly employed a balancing test of employer and employee interests
to determine whether an activity should be protected under the Act. See Textile Workers
Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 (1965).
The duty to bargain under section 9(a) embraces subjects that might appear to be
exclusive employer concerns, for example, granting merit increases, NLRB v. J.H. Allison
Co., 165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948), establishing minimum
rentals with outside parties, Local 24, Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959), and
the contracting out of work in some cases, Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLR.B, 379
U.S. 203 (1964).
Although employers speak of a "management rights" doctrine that emphasizes the
necessity of unobstructed decision making in the direction of enterprise, courts have
nevertheless considered employee interests in such cases. See Rabin, The Decline and
Fall of Fibreboard, N.Y.U. 24TH CONMENCE ON LABOR 287, 249-54 (1971). The courts have
focused on whether the proposed subject is one amenable to collective bargaining. See
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the employee and the union in union presence outweigh the possible
interference with employer interests.
The employer has a significant interest in his power to investigate
plant conditions or job performance, but the right of union representa-
tion would not unduly interfere with this interest. The steward would
not act like counsel in a criminal case, instructing the employee what
to do or say or warning him of possible self-incrimination.8 3 An em-
ployee who, for example, refuses to answer questions relevant to em-
ployer operations would be subject to discharge.84 The employer's in-
terest in avoiding excessive conferencing may be satisfied by a clear
definition of and limitation on the types of meetings at which steward
presence is required. 5
Notwithstanding the apprehensions of employers, union represen-
tation at disciplinary meetings may bring them substantial benefits.
Early union involvement will allow the steward to discourage the
prosecution of frivolous grievances.80 Early union review of employer
decisions will also give the employer an opportunity to correct errors
that might produce ill feeling among employees. At the time of the
meeting neither party is locked into any position, but as a grievance
proceeds, the ability to compromise diminishes.8 7 The inadequacy of
grievance procedures for fact finding affects both employers and
unions.88 Union representation could guarantee a better understand-
ing of the infraction charged, and early, informal consideration of the
merits of -possible grievances might reduce the costs that the employer
must bear in formalized grievance procedures.8 9
Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960) (National Rail-
way Labor Act).
83 It must be noted, however, that an employer could justify exclusion of a steward
only for flagrant obstruction of the meeting. See NLR.B v. Thor Power Tool Co., 351
F.2d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 1965) (presentation of grievances allows some leeway for impul-
sive behavior).
84 See Simoniz Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 658 (1964). But see United Parcel Serv. Inc., 45 Lab.
Arb. 1050 (1965).
85 See text and notes at notes 90-98 infra.
86 See Caterpillar Tractor Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 647, 651 (1965) (Dworkin, Arbitrator).
87 Gemrich, The Grievance Procedure in the Administration of the Collective Bargain-
ing Agreement, in SYMPOSIUM ON LABOR. RELATIONS, 1961, at 293, 301 (R. Slovenko ed. 1961).
88 See S. SLicHER et al., supra note 76, at 646-47; Summers, supra note 8, at 85.
89 Inadequate investigation of grievances by some unions has been considered a factor
in the overload that plagues arbitration in some major industries. Ross, Distressed Griev-
ance Procedures and their Rehabilitation, in LABoR ARBITRATION AND INDUSTRIAL CHANGE,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 104, 107,
109 (1965). When the grievance procedure is overloaded, there is temptation for both
employer and union to engage in horse trading of grievances, a result sometimes harm-
ful to individual interests. Id. at 111.
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C. Defining a Disciplinary Meeting
Recognition of the right to union presence at disciplinary meetings
requires a clear identification of the characteristics of such a meeting.
Fears have been expressed that union representation would cause ex-
cessive conferencing, disrupting employer operations by requiring
stewards to halt work to attend. 0 The present unclear definition is un-
desirable because it creates disputes over when the steward must be
called. These objections are not to the general idea of union presence at
disciplinary meetings, but rather the specific form of implementation.
Limitations can be imposed that would minimize these problems.
The Board's current test does not provide an administrable method
for determining when an employee or the union can demand the pres-
ence of a steward, because it relies heavily on elusive determinations of
intent. A test is needed that gives a reasonably accurate indication of
the nature of the meeting without relying on elaborate inquiries into
what might have been said or intended by the parties.
The union and the employee are primarily interested in having a
steward present when the employer is likely to make a decision on the
employee's culpability or take disciplinary action.91 Some of the present
uncertainties can be eliminated by requiring the employer to give the
employee and the union notice of the purpose of the meeting. If the
notice indicates a disciplinary purpose, the employee's right will be
clear. If the meeting is labelled investigatory but in fact is disciplinary,
the employee attending the meeting without a steward will be entitled
to revocation of the disciplinary action.
The test of whether a meeting is disciplinary should be its result. If
discipline is imposed immediately or within a short time after the meet-
ing, the meeting should be characterized as disciplinary. It might be
argued that an employer could avoid the requirements of this rule by
postponing discipline. Such an evasion, however, is very much against
the employer's interests; an employer will not wish to retain a delin-
90 Fears of interference with employer operations may be exaggerated. Several major
collective bargaining agreements now provide for some form of representation at dis-
ciplinary meetings. See I B.N.A. COLLEa rVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACrS
21:22 (General Motors Corp. & UAW § 76A); Id. 27:6 (Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. &
Rubber Workers § V(5)); Id. 28:15 (U.S. Steel Corp. & Steelworkers § 101.2).
The parties might agree to apportion the costs of conferences involving stewards who
are summoned from the shop floor, as is now done with the costs of processing grievances.
About 51 percent of labor contracts provide for payment to stewards for presenting, in-
vestigating, and processing grievances. About one quarter of these place some ceiling on
such paid activity. B.N.A. BAsIC PATMRNS IN UNION CONTRACrs 51:5 (5th ed. 1961).
91 As in the ciminal law field, it is often difficult to determine when a meeting is
"accusatory." Cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964). See also Silard, supra note
33, at 281 n.8.
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quent employee on the payroll or to delay hiring and training a re-
placement.92 The result test, like the Board's current test, focuses on
employer intent but relies on a much more administrable indicator of
intent and encourages the employer to be honest about the nature of the
meeting.
The result test would solve many of the problems created when the
employer claims that the meeting began as an investigation but be-
came disciplinary in light of information revealed by initial inquiries.
The employer would be required to judge for himself the likelihood of
a disciplinary result and summon the steward if his suspicion had fo-
cused on the employee. Disciplinary action taken after a meeting that
began as an investigation would be analyzed as though discipline had
been contemplated from the beginning.93 Even a modest risk of nulli-
fication of the disciplinary action is likely to outweigh the inconveni-
ence of bringing in the steward; the employer will therefore be mo-
tivated to allow the steward whenever discipline seems possible.9
Much of the uncertainty and administrative awkwardness of the
Board's current test results from the Board's protection of refusals to
attend a meeting without a steward present. Where the employee
reasonably believes the meeting will be disciplinary and is fired for
refusing to attend -without a steward, the Board has ordered rein-
statement.95 These prospective challenges to the employer's action force
the Board to render decisions about the nature of meetings without the
single most important indicator, the result. Prospective challenges re-
quire decisions on the reasonableness of the employee's apprehensions,
the likelihood of disciplinary action, and other evanescent considera-
tions. There is no adequate reason to entertain such challenges. Under
the result test, if an employee is summoned to a meeting labeled in-
vestigatory and refuses to attend, he may be dismissed for insubordina-
92 Cost and impracticality would deter employers from eliciting necessary facts or ad-
missions at an "investigatory" meeting and later holding a p'io forma disciplinary meet-
ing. This evasion is also open to detection by the Board through application of the
timing standard.
93 See Levitt, Practical Problems in the Handling of Grievances and Labor Arbitrations,
S GA. L. REv. 411, 424 (1969). Even under the present test, disclaimers by the employer
of any intention to discuss employee discipline does not foreclose the reasonableness of
the employee's belief on the purpose of the meeting. See Southern Cal. Edison Co., 61
Lab. Arb. 453, 463 (1973).
94 The result test would, of course, apply to "prior" discipline. For example, where the
employer summons an employee to a conference after imposing provisional discipline, the
meeting should be considered disciplinary because the issue of the provisional discipline
is present. Where the employer has charged an employee with a specific violation of com-
pany policy or has issued a reprimand that may go on the employee's record, there should
be a strong presumption that the conference is disciplinary.
95 See note 7 supra.
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don. He loses nothing by attending the meeting, however, because if
discipline does result the Board will nullify it regardless of its pro-
priety. The only inquiries are whether discipline resulted and whether
a steward was present.96
Elimination of prospective challenges would greatly reduce disrup-
tion of the employer's operation. Employees would not be able to refuse
to attend meetings in the hope that the Board would later vindicate
their decisions, and employers would be free to investigate plant con-
ditions without a steward present, as long as they did not discipline the
employee.
Disruption of operations would be further reduced through recog-
nition of certain limits on the right to steward presence. Since the rea-
son for the right to union presence is the possibility that discipline will
be imposed, discussions with supervisory personnel or foremen who
possess no power to authorize discipline should be excluded.97 For ex-
traordinary discipline problems the employer could also justify not
summoning the steward. For example, in emergency situations involv-
ing sabotage, violence, or violations of safety rules that create imme-
diate danger to others, the necessity for quick investigation and action
would override the interest in employee protection.9"
D. Reconciling Conflicts Between Section 7 and Section 9(a) Rights
There are two possible conflicts in the interests of the employee and
the union regarding attendance at a particular disciplinary meeting.
First, if an employee requests a steward, the union should not be
allowed to refuse. The union's duty of fair representation 9 includes
96 Undue employer harassment under the guise of investigatory meetings would, of
course, continue to be an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(1).
97 The Board has recognized the problems of permitting steward intervention into
conversations with such supervisory personnel. Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197, 199, 79
L.R.R.M. 1269, 1271 (1972): "We would not apply the rule to such run-of-the-mill shop-
floor conversations as, for example, the giving of instructions or training or needed cor-
rections of work techniques." The current U.S. Steel Corp. & Steelworkers contract in-
corporates such a limitation. See 1 B.NA. COLLECIVE BARGAiNING NEGOTIATIONS AND CON-
TRAars, supra note 90, at 28:15.
Employers could avoid disciplinary meetings by automatically following the recom-
mendations of such supervisors on disciplinary matters. This type of procedure, however,
is an invitation to error and prejudice, with a good chance of reversal in the grievance
procedure. The problems here are similar to the problems of summary discipline without
any employer investigation of the alleged infraction. See note 7 supra.
98 Cf. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 Lab. Arb. 837, 841 (1971) (employer access to informa-
tion on personnel is critical to operation of an enterprise involving public safety). The
Board could also decide that full application of the right to representation in certain
industries would be so impractical that it would frustrate other purposes of the Act and
could restrict this right in such exceptional situations. Cf. Food Store Employee's Union
Local 547 v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (no solicitation rule in stores).
99 See Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 523 U.S. 248, 255 (1944); Steele v. Louisville Se N. Ry.
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the duty to provide assistance to an employee who has invoked his sec-
tion 7 rights. The duty to provide union representation at a disciplinary
meeting does not conflict with the right of the union to decline repre-
sentation of unfounded claims at various levels of the grievance pro-
cedure, because the disciplinary meeting is the first opportunity for
the steward to investigate the claim.100
Second, the employee may desire to confront the employer alone,
while the union wishes to intervene to protect the interests of the bar-
gaining unit under section 9(a). The proviso in section 9(a) on union
presence at the adjustment of grievances suggests by analogy that the
union has a right to be present. Under section 9(a), although employees
may prosecute their own grievances, the union must be given the oppor-
tunity to be present to guarantee that the employer's decision is neither
contrary to the collective bargaining agreement nor an undesirable prec-
edent for other employees.10' The union has a similar interest in pro.
tecting the whole unit through its presence at disciplinary meetings, and
it is appropriate for that interest to override the individual employee's
interest in private consultation. The employee might desire that the
union be present only as a silent witness, but again the analogy to the
proviso to section 9(a) suggests the right to a greater role. 02 Even where
the employee is hostile to union presence, the precedential value of dis-
cipline cases requires that the union be given full opportunity to argue
its views. In such cases, however, the union would not be speaking for
the employee, nor could it prevent him from presenting his case. Its
voice would be only that of the bargaining unit.
V. WAIVER OF UNION PRESENCE
Recognition of the right to union presence at disciplinary meetings
raises the question whether the union can waive in collective bargaining
its right under section 9(a) or the employee's right under section 7. A
related question is whether the employee or the union may choose to
waive their rights in individual cases.
Co., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944) (National Railway Labor Act). This duty is owned to both
the individual employee and the members of the bargaining unit in general.
100 It is therefore not a situation like that in Vacca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), where
the steward could distinguish the value of claims and allocate union resources accordingly.
Cf. Local 12, United Rubber, C.L. S& P. Wkrs. v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 17 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
101 See Dunau, Employee Participation in the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargain.
ing, 50 CoLtmr. L. R v. 781, 744 (1950). See also text and note at note 81 supra.
102 Id. at 744, 745; see Elgin, J. &c E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 737 n.35 (1944)
(National Railway Labor Act)..
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A. Waiver In Collective Bargaining
1. The Employee's Section 7 Right. Because of the individual em-
ployee's stake in union representation, the Board should be reluctant
to permit a union to bargain away the employee's section 7 right.
10 3
In order to promote the peaceful settlement of labor disputes, national
labor policy does allow unions to bargain away the right to strike,10 4 but
the right of the employee to seek union assistance at disciplinary meet-
ings is not this type of right. Unlike waiver of the right to strike, sacri-
fice of this employee right serves no public interest.10 5 In addition, the
protection is a guarantee of procedural fairness and should not be open
to bargaining to the same extent as economic benefits. Where economic
benefits are traded away in the bargaining process, employees who
would have preferred what was sacrificed over what was received suffer
only a bad bargain. In contrast, if this procedural right is bargained
away, employees who would have preferred to keep it will suffer an in-
creased risk of unfair discipline.
2. The Union's Section 9(a) Right. The union should be able to
bargain away its right despite the fact that in many cases it could be
withdrawing protection from the employee. 1°6 The Board and the
courts have ruled that a union may waive its rights to bargain over
many issues, including its rights to employer information,10 7 to be con-
sulted about rate increases, 08 and to bargain over hiring and firing.1 9
103 Union waiver of employees' statutory rights should require a showing that the
bargaining unit's rights and interests override the individual's interests. See NLRB v.
Magnavox Co., 94 S. Ct. 1099 (1974); NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., Textile Wkrs.
Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213, 218 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Comment, Validity of
Restrictions on Employee Activities in Opposition to an Incumbent Union, 41 U. Cm. L.
REv. 190, 193, 196 (1973). If the Board does permit such a waiver, it should at least fol-
low its standards for the waiver of other statutory rights and require that the waiver be
"dear and unmistakable." See Murphy Diesel Co. v. NLRB, 454 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1971).
104 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 US. 574
(1960).
1705 Cf. Matter of Bethlehem Steel Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 341, 345-46, 25 L.R.R.M. 1564, 1567-
68 (1950). But see Western Elec. Co. 198 N.L.R.B. No. 82, 80 L.R.R.M. 1705, 1707 (1972)
(concurring opinion of Chairman Miller).
106 Where a union has waived its rights under section 9(a) but has also instructed its
members to exercise their section 7 right, this waiver would be of little importance. The
contracting parties would recognize that these are separate items for the purpose of bar-
gaining and would understand the practical effect of this difference within any given
plant.
107 See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 746, 751 (6th Cir. 1963); Inter-
national News Serv. Div. of the Hearst Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 1067, 1071, 36 L.R.R.M. 1454,
1456 (1955).
108 Globe-Union, Inc., 97 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1041, 29 L.R.R.M. 1198, 1200 (1952).
109 NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1942).
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B. Waiver in Individual Cases
1. The Employee's Section 7 Right. Because the right to union
representation under section 7 is that of the individual employee, he
should be able to waive union assistance to the extent compatible with
the union's exercise of its right under section 9(a)." 0 An employee
given notice of the meeting can evaluate the need for such assistance.
If he objects to the presence of a particular steward, perhaps out of
fear of bias,"' he could request that another available steward, or even
a coworker, be permitted to accompany him.
Before inferring that a waiver has occurred, however, the Board
must assure itself that the employee acted knowingly and voluntarily.
The right being waived is designed to prevent intimidation by the
employer. It would be incongruous to infer a waiver without a clear
indication that the very tactics the right is meant to prevent were not
used to coerce a surrender of protection." 2
2. The Union's Section 9(a) Right. In cases that do not demand the
union's presence at the meeting as part of its duty of fair representa-
tion,"" the union should be permitted to waive its right to have a
steward attend. There is no danger of intimidation here, and the union
must be given discretion to determine what cases merit its attention.
This discretion is especially important if the union has agreed in col-
lective bargaining to place limits on the frequency or total number of
discretionary interventions in disciplinary meetings." 4
CONCLUSION
The NLRB has found that both unions and employees have a right
to union presence at disciplinary meetings. The failure of the Board to
articulate an adequate foundation for these rights or to consider the ef-
fect of these rights on employer operations, however, has led to a re-
jection of the Board's position by the courts of appeals that have con-
sidered the issue. Sections 7 and 9(a) provide a sound statutory basis
for the rights. Recognition of these rights, properly limited to situations
where disciplinary action appears to have resulted from the meeting,
need not disrupt employer operations. The benefits of the union's
11o See text and note at note 101 supra.
III Cf. Service Technology Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 845, 80 L.R.R.M. 1187 (1972) (steward
conflict of interest).
112 See note 78 supra.
113 See text and note at note 99 supra.
114 See note 90 supra. No limit could be placed, however, on the union's right to ful-
fill its duty of fair representation by attending in any case where the employee has re-
quested a steward. See text and note at note 99 supra.
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presence, to both the employee facing discipline and his coworkers, out-
weigh the possible effects on employer interests. Waivers of the employ-
ee's right to steward presence at disciplinary meetings must be narrowly
construed both in collective bargaining and in individual cases. Any
less protection would fail to give the employee's procedural rights the
respect they deserve.
Theodore C. Hirt
